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NOTES
Antitrust Law-Horizontal Division of Territories and Customer Restrictions
In a recent antitrust case, United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,1
the United States Supreme Court has taken the opportunity to clarify

the legal status of horizontal trade restraints under the Sherman AntiTrust Act 2-to

wit, they are illegal.

Two issues were before the Court in Topco: first, whether the formation of an association by small- and medium-sized grocery chains for
the purpose of allocating exclusive sales territories among themselves in

order to market privately branded products procured by the association
violates section one of the Sherman Act; and secondly, whether the

requirement established by Topco's bylaws that all member firms receive special permission from the association before wholesaling association products violates section one of the Sherman Act. More succinctly, the qustion was whether the rule of reason 3 or a per se rule4

should be applied to horizontal territorial and customer restraints.
While a pure case of horizontal trade restraints uncomplicated by intentional price fixing arrangements had not been presented previously, the

been presaged
court's holding-that a per se rule is applicable-had
5
repeatedly through dictum and implication.

In the 1940's Topco Associates, Inc., was formed by a group of
small grocery chains. Some larger chains were already marketing lines

of privately branded products and had thereby gained a competitive
advantage. Privately branded products allow the owning chain to sell a

high-quality product at a lower price and still realize as much or more
profit as would be realized from the sale of a comparable nationally
advertised brand. The privately branded products also confer upon the

selling chain a certain amount of good will and permit it to enjoy the
market power' associated with complete dominion over a branded prod'92 S. Ct. 1126 (1972).
251 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). The pertinent provisions of the Act are set out in the text accompanying note 13 infra.
3See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
'See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
'See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967); White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). These cases were not precisely on point. Schwinn
and White involved vertically imposed restraints. Still, in these as well as other cases, the Court
went to great lengths to make clear its position concerning horizontal trade restraints. For example,
in White, the Court stated that "horizontal territorial limitations. . . are naked restraints of trade
with no purpose except stifling of competition." Id.
'This type of market power is generally referred to as monopolistic competition. See, e.g., E.
CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (7th ed. 1956).
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uct. This arrangement seems to be beneficial to everyone-the smaller
producer has an expanded market, the selling chain enjoys increased
profits, and the consumer pays lower prices. The only interests injured
by this marketing scheme are those of the smaller retailers who do not
have the resources to market privately branded products. The formation
of Topco was the answer of one group of smaller chains to the competitive challenge of the larger chains.7
Topco is an association of approximately twenty-five small and
medium-sized retail food chains operating in well over half the states.
Except for their association with Topco for purchasing purposes, the
food chains are completely independent of each other. None of the
member firms operates under the Topco name, and there is no pooling
of earnings, management, or advertising resources.8 Topco merely owns
the brand names for a rather large line of foods and nonfood items
which it makes available to its member retailers.'
Most of Topco's member firms are in a strong competitive position
in their respective areas. The average market share of Topco's members
amounts to approximately 6%, ranging from 1.5% in some territories
to 16% in others.°-The members' combined retail sales in 1967 came
to 2.3 billion dollars. This amount was exceeded by only three of the
large national grocery chains." The association now contracts with suppliers to make available to its members more than one thousand separate products.12 All of this indicates that both collectively and separately
the association and its members are a potent economic force.
Section one of the Sherman Act begins with the language: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . .

."I'

In Standard Oil Co.

v. United States, the Court stated that section one contemplated some
test for examining trade restraints and that "the standard of reason
which had been applied at the common law.

. .

was intended to be the

measure used ..
,," Thus the rule of reason was developed by the
courts because of their practical need for a working standard in default
192 S. Ct. at 1128-32.
Vd. at 1129.
Vd. at 1128-32.
11Id. at 1130.
11d.
121d. at 1129.
1315 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
"221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
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of a legislative test. 15

There are many difficulties involved in making an investigation
under the rule of reason. It requires an extended analysis by the courts
of highly technical areas of the general economy and of the particular

markets concerned." This consumes considerable court time and requires a fairly high degree of technical expertise. For example, the

district court spent nearly three months in deciding Topco under the rule
of reason. While the rule of reason has the advantage of flexibility, this

very flexibility also prevents business enterprises from making reliable
judgments about the legality of contemplated marketing activities.

The need for certainty in the law and the desirability of avoiding
the many difficulties and complexities inherently involved in the application of the rule of reason have given rise to the development of a set of
per se rules that are applied in determining antitrust liability in given
situations. 7 In Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, Justice

Black, a proponent of the per se rules, explained their utility and operation as follows: "IT]here are certain agreements or practices which

because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have

caused or the business excuse for their use."18 In short, a practice held
to be illegal per se under the Sherman Act is conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable." Since the rule is basically a tool of convenience the
courts have been careful to limit its application to agreements that are

essentially anticompetitive. The agreements to which per se rules have
been most generally applied are tying arrangements,2 ° division of mar"See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
"In Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), the Court tersely stated the
scope of an investigation under the rule of reason. There the Court said that in determining the
reasonableness of a particular restraint, the courts should look to "the facts peculiar to the business
to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained are
all relevant facts."
"Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,5 (1958). See generally Van Cise, The Future
of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1964).
18356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (emphasis added).
"United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1956).
20
A tying arrangement is the refusal of a firm to sell one product over which it has some
control-for example, a patented product-without an unrelated product, "tied," to it. For cases
involving discussion of this practice, see United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
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kets, 2' group boycotts, 22 and price fixing."
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois decided
Topco under the rule of reason. The court made extensive findings of
fact concerning markets, market shares, history, and purpose and concluded that "[t]he Topco licensing provisions are not inherently unreasonable and have no substantial adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market. 21 4 It determined that any reduction in competition
among the member firms and even the complete elimination of competition in Topco brands were outweighed by the increased competition that
the member firms are enabled to bring to bear on the large national and
regional grocery chains.2 The court seemed persuaded largely by testimony from Topco officials to the effect that the association would be
26
ruined if not allowed to continue its restrictive practices.
On appeal,27 the Supreme Court held that Topco's practice of providing licenses to member firms for the exclusive right to sell Topco
products in their designated territories is a horizontal territorial restraint,2 and, per se, a violation of the Sherman Act. Similarly, the
restrictions placed upon the wholesaling of association products by
members was held to be illegal. The Court rejected the implication in
the district court's opinion that "good intentions" can take an agreement out of the per se rule 9 and concluded that no private group of
individuals has the power to foreclose competition in one sector of the
economy in order to promote competition in another sector.10
392 (1947).
21

Division of markets is the division of territories or the allocation of customers by competing

firms. For cases involving discussion of this practice, see Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States,
394 U.S. 131 (1969); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United State
v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593 (1951); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
"Group boycotts are agreements among a group of firms not to deal with some firm or group

of firms. For cases involving discussion of this practice, see United States v. General Motors Corp.,
384 U.S. 127 (1966); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
"3Price fixing is an agreement among competitors to set prices at a given level. For cases

involving discussion of this practice, see Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 ( 1964); United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.

150 (1940).
4

2 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
2Id. at 1043.
21Id. at 1042.

"1The appeal was made directly to the United States Supreme Court persuant to § 2 of the
Expediting Act of 1913, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970). 92 S. Ct. at 1128.
2192 S.Ct. at 1135.

29d.
"Mr. Justice Blackman wrote in a concurring opinion that while the application of a per se
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In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that no
pure case involving a horizontal territorial restraint had ever been presented.3 For this reason, and because much of the language cited by
the majority concerning horizontal territorial restraints was only dictum, he stated that the Court need not and should not apply a per se
rule."2 The Chief Justice did not deal directly with the customer restrictions aspect of the case.
The dissenting opinion relied on White Motor Co. v. United
States33 and United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 34 but was somewhat misleading in its treatment of these cases. Both White and
Schwinn involved restrictions of territories and customers imposed vertically by manufacturers on distributors and dealers. In White, the district court had applied a per se rule by way of summary judgment in
favor of the Government. The Supreme Court reversed, but the reversal
was probably motivated more by a desire on the part of the Supreme
Court to have the issue decided after full disclosure of facts at trial than
by disagreement with the district court on the applicability of the per
se rule. This interpretation of White is reinforced by the Court's disposition of Schwinn, a case involving facts substantially identical to those
in White. Even though the defendant, Schwinn, did not appeal the district court's holding that the territorial restraints there were per se
illegal and despite the Government's failure, perhaps prompted by
White, to argue for a per se rule as to the customer restrictions, the
Court went ahead to say that "[u]nder the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine
areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it. Such restraints are so obviously
destructive of competition that their mere existence is enough."' ' As
to goods sold, the Supreme Court of the United States had this to say
3
about both territorial and customer restrictions in Schwinn: 1
Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted
with dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter to restrict
rule to the kind of cooperative buying arrangement presented by Topco gives an anomolous result,
the rule is too firmly established and should now be changed only by Congress. Id. at 1136.
31

1d. at 1137.

321d.
-372 U.S. 253 (1963).
34388 U.S. 365 (1967).

-"Id.at 379.
36388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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territory or persons to whom the product may be transferred-whether
by explicit agreement or by silent combination or understanding
with
3
his vendee is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Topco arrangement has the appearance of one brought about
vertically because the restraints are technically imposed by the association upon the member retailers. In effect, however, these restraints are
effected horizontally" by the member firms who created the association.39 In United States v. Sealy, Inc.," the Court was faced with an
arrangement almost identical to that in Topco (Sealy also involved price
fixing). Sealy, Inc., owned the trade marks for bedding products. It
licensed manufacturers in different sections of the country to produce
and market mattresses under the Sealy brand. The licensees were given
exclusive territories; no one could be granted a license to manufacture
and sell Sealy mattresses in a licensee's territory, and licensees were not
permitted to market Sealy branded mattresses outside their designated
territories. The Sealy licensees owned substantially all of Sealy's stock
and completely controlled its operations.41 There, the Court stated, "If
we look at substance rather than form, there is little room for debate.
These must be classified as horizontal restraints. 42
In view of the language in Schwinn concerning a vertical restraint
on territories and customers and in view of the characterization in Sealy
of Topco-type arrangements as horizontal restraints, it should come as
no surprise that the Court would hold the restraints in Topco to be
illegal per se. Horizontal restraints are considered highly detrimental to
competition because they are imposed by agreement between firms at
the same level of trade-firms that should be directly competing with
each other. It is for this reason that the courts have traditionally been
more suspicious of horizontal restraints than of the vertical ones declared to be illegal in Schwinn. While the Topco result might have been
predicted, the fact remains that the case illustrates the inflexibility of
application of a per se rule. The majority in Topco seems to agree with
"Id. at 382.
3'See Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Law in North Carolina-FederalLaw
Compared, 50 N.C.L. REV. 199, 221-23 (1972).
3
"Topco is completely controlled by its members who own all of the outstanding shares of
stock. The board of directors is drawn exclusively from the executive officers of the member firms,
and the executive officers of Topco are drawn exclusively from the Topco board of directors. There
are restrictions upon the alienation of Topco stock by the members. 92 S. Ct. at 1129.
40388 U.S. 350 (1967).
4
Id. at 351-54.
'11d. at 352.
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the district court that the Topco arrangement may not be evil and may
even be a positive good. Nevertheless, the agreement is illegal under the
per se rule.
In -White, the Court suggested that in cases involving failing businesses and newcomers, exceptions might be made to allow decision
under the rule of reason rather than under a per se rule.43 While Topco
involved neither situation, perhaps another exception could be devised
to cover cases like Topco involving a technically forbidden arrangement
that may in fact be beneficial to the public from a competitive standpoint. Professor Oppenheim has made a proposal along these lines. He
has suggested that a primafacie approach be used in the application of
the per se rule.A Under this approach, the Government need only show
the existence of the forbidden arrangement or practice to establish a
primafacie case. Then the burden would shift to the defendant to show
the reasonableness of, or justification for, the practice. The difficulty
with this proposal is that the courts would still be required to "ramble
through the wilds of economic theory,"45 with the result that the purpose
of the per se rule would be defeated.
Topco was decided correctly because the need for per se rules is
obvious and because the very nature of a per se rule requires that it be
applied blindly. To be sure, the rule could be extremely oppressive if it
were haphazardly formulated; but the courts have carefully considered
horizontal territorial restraints and customer restrictions in many different business settings and time after time have found them to be anticompetitive and without any redeeming value. The idea of competitors getting together, dividing up markets, and agreeing not to compete is repugnant to the spirit of the Sherman Act. Topco probably presents these
restraints in the most appealing setting possible, but it is nevertheless
apparent that the arrangement eliminates competition insofar as Topco
brands are concerned and reduces the ability of nonmember small retailers to compete. While the Topco arrangement does allow the member
firms to compete better with the larger chains, it is far from clear that
this benefit to the public outweighs the damage caused by reduced competition.
It is not clear that the Topco-type arrangement has been badly
damaged by the decision. The association still has the right to sell only
11372 U.S. at 263-64.
"Oppenheim, FederalAntitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised NationalAntitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L. REV. 1139, 1158-61 (1952).
1192 S. Ct. at 1134 N.10.
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to member chains; and, because of geographical separation, the members are not natural competitors. But even if some direct competition
should arise as a result of the expansion of some of the members, there
remains a competitive advantage, albeit shared, over the nonmember
chains operating in the area of overlap. Also, since the reason for the
formation of the association was to provide the member retail chains
with private labels so that they might better compete with the larger
chains, it would seem that wholesaling should amount to a relatively
insignificant part of the members' sales.
The significance of Topco is that it reaffirms the Court's commitment to per se rules of the illegality of certain agreements and practices
under the Sherman Act and establishes to a certainty that horizontal
territorial restraints and customer restrictions are per se illegal even
when not accompanied by price fixing." It appears that the Court has
followed a more or less straight course in arriving at the Topco decision.
When faced with this pure case of horizontal territorial restraints and
customer restrictions, the Court did just what it had indicated it would
do. Now, with Topco placed beside Schwinn, it seems clear that division
of territories among competitors or restrictions upon the customers to
whom they may sell are per se violations of the Sherman Act whether
the arrangement is brought about horizontally or vertically.
D.

STEVE ROBBINS

Constitutional Law: Conventional Reluctance or Doctrinal Departure?
The Political Question Doctrine.
Shortly before the 1972 Democratic National Convention, the Supreme Court was asked to consider a suit, O'Brien v. Brown,' filed by
California delegates who had been excluded from the Convention by a
ruling of the Democratic Credentials Committee.' The Court, uncomfortably confined by lack of time, issued a brief opinion which both
delayed action on the petition for certiorari and stayed the Court of
"See generally Case Comment, Horizontal TerritorialRestraints and the Per Se Rule, 28
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 457 (1971).

'92 S. Ct. 2718 (1972) (per curiam). The petition for certiorari was filed on July 6, 1972 and
the full convention began July 10th.
2
The 1972 Credentials Committee had issued its decision on June 29, 1972. Brown v. O'Brien,
No. 72-1628, at 4 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).

